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Monetary authorities intervene in the currency markets in order to pursue a monetary 
rule and/or to smooth exchange rate volatility caused by speculative attacks. In the 
present paper we investigate for possible intervention effects on the volatility of 
nominal exchange rates and the estimated equilibrium behaviour of real exchange 
rates. The main argument of the paper is that omission of intervention effects -when 
they are significant- would bias the ability to detect any PPP-based behaviour of the 
real exchange rates in the long run. Positive evidence for this argument comes from 
the experience of six Central and Eastern European economies, whose exchange 
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1. Introduction 
Official intervention in the foreign exchange market is defined as official 
purchases and sales of foreign exchange by the monetary authorities in order to affect 
the exchange rate. The literature on intervention states that central banks intervene in 
order (i) to correct misalignments or to stabilise the exchange rate at predetermined 
targeted levels or within targeted rates of change (when, for example, they pursue a 
monetary policy rule) and (ii) to address disorderly market conditions – mainly high 
exchange rate volatility and/or sharp exchange rate fluctuations caused by speculative 
bubbles phenomena.
1 As a result, in the first case, interventions may cause the real 
exchange rate to move in a target rate for long periods of time -and this can be 
interpreted as equilibrium values which shift from time to time- whereas in the second 
case, interventions may lead the exchange rate to move back to fundamental-based 
levels and/or to adjust faster to its long-run equilibrium level (for similar arguments 
see, inter alia, Sweeney, 1999).
2  
Whether or not intervention has an impact on exchange rates, offering the 
authorities an independent policy tool for influencing the foreign exchange market is 
an issue of great policy importance. As a consequence, intervention and its effects has 
been the subject of a large number of empirical articles in the international economics 
literature (see, inter alia, Baillie, 2000). The relevant empirical articles provide mixed 
evidence on the effectiveness of official interventions in the currency markets. Early 
empirical studies using data from the 1970s suggest that intervention operations have, 
at most, a short-lived influence on exchange rates (see the survey in Dominguez and 
Frankel, 1993a), whereas more recent studies indicate that intervention influences 
both the level and variance of exchange rates (for a survey of the articles written till 
the mid 1990s, see Sarno and Taylor, 2002a). Most recent empirical studies (written 
from the mid 1990s on) tend to agree that there exists a significant effect of the 
monetary authorities’ intervention at least on the short-run dynamics of the exchange 
rates. Empirical evidence is based on advanced country experience, mainly the US, 
                                                           
1 We use the standard definition of intervention which focuses on exchange rate-related objectives and 
not the definition used by Canales-Kriljenko et al. (2003) which also accounts for operations to 
accumulate and supply foreign exchange to the market.    
2 For a survey of the literature on theoretical and policy issues concerning intervention see inter alia 
Canales-Kriljenko et al. (2003) and Sarno and Taylor (2002a).   6
Germany (and the EU), Japan and Australia, given that data on central bank 
operations are available for these countries.
3  
Alongside the studies on intervention, a vast empirical literature on the 
behaviour of the real exchange rates and the validity of purchasing power parity (PPP) 
has grown up during the last three decades or so and by now constitutes a great body 
of the international finance literature. Most recent studies use the concept of 
stationarity and cointegration to test for PPP. They raise the low power problem of the 
early studies, which is attributed to short sample sizes and the low statistical power of 
the early tests, and advocate the use of advanced econometric techniques (for a 
survey, see, inter alia, Sarno and Taylor, 2002b). Within this strand of the empirical 
literature, two recent studies raise the argument that the empirical inability to detect 
stationarity of the real exchange rate or some version of PPP may be due to the effects 
of interventions by the monetary authorities in the currency markets.
4 In particular, 
Taylor (2004) argues that intervention operations result in non-linear dynamics for the 
real exchange rate. He develops a regime switching model, in which the transition 
probabilities of switching between stable and unstable regimes depend upon 
intervention activity, the extent of exchange rate misalignment and the duration of the 
regime. The estimation of a Markov-switching model for the real DM/US$ rate 
provides results favourable to his arguments.  
  Based on a somewhat similar idea, Brissimis, Sideris and Voumvaki (2005) 
argue that long-run PPP is not likely to be evidenced for economies in which the 
monetary authorities intervene in the exchange rate market to support a certain 
exchange rate rule. They claim that policy behaviour affects the short-run adjustment 
to PPP and the ability to uncover long-run PPP empirically, even when PPP holds. 
Their analysis is based on a simple theoretical model in which short-run intervention 
                                                           
3 In particular: Positive evidence for the effectiveness of intervention strategies on the US$/DM 
exchange rate volatility is presented in Dominguez and Frankel (1993b), Bonser-Neal and Tanner 
(1996), Hung (1997), Dominguez (1998), Fatum and Hutchison (2003a). Support for the effectiveness 
of intervention and monetary policies on the dynamics of the US$/yen rate is provided by Bonser-Neal 
and Tanner (1996), Hung (1997), Dominguez (1998), Fatum and Hutchison (2003b), Brissimis and 
Chionis (2004) and Frenkel et al. (2005). Bonser-Neal et al. (1998) find that the US$ exchange rates 
respond immediately to US monetary policy actions. Usman and Savvides (1994) indicate that French 
intervention does not exert a significant influence on the FF/DM rate. Intervention is shown to be 
associated with the volatility (Edison et al., 2003) and the conditional variance of the return (Kim et al., 
2000) of the Australian $/US$ rate. Aguilar and Nydahl (2000) provide weak support for the effects of 
intervention on the level and the volatility of the Swedish krona /US$ rate.  
4 Actually, the idea that foreign exchange market intervention may prevent an exchange rate from 
always being at its PPP-defined value goes back to Cassel (see Officer, 1976).    7
strategies target a particular value for the real exchange rate which does not 
necessarily equal the PPP rate. Positive evidence for their arguments comes mainly 
from the experience of the Greek economy. 
  In a paper belonging to a related strand of the literature, which investigates the 
source of shocks to real and nominal exchange rates (see, inter alia, Clarida and Gali, 
1994), Kim (2003) comes up with similar suggestions. Kim analyses jointly the 
effects of foreign exchange intervention strategies –pursued by setting exchange 
reserves- and monetary policy on the exchange rate. He finds that foreign exchange 
policy shocks have substantial effects on the exchange rate, which are even more 
important sources of exchange rate fluctuations than conventional monetary policy 
shocks. He argues that it is important to model foreign exchange intervention 
explicitly in the study of exchange rate behaviour.    
  In the present paper, we extend this nascent literature by investigating possible 
intervention effects on the volatility of the exchange rates and the estimated long-run 
behaviour of exchange rates with respect to that of domestic and foreign prices, using 
data from six Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) in transition. We first 
examine the importance of intervention policies on the dynamics of exchange rates, 
and secondly, once the significance of these policies is indicated, we investigate 
whether the omission of intervention effects biases our ability to detect any 
fundamental-based behaviour of the exchange rates in the long run. When the 
monetary authorities intervene in the foreign exchange markets to influence the 
behaviour of the exchange rates, the exchange rates reaches levels that would not 
reach if left to be influenced by goods market forces alone. Central banks may 
intervene to stabilise the exchange rate at a targeted level, which does not necessarily 
equal the PPP level, when they support a certain exchange rate rule. They may also 
intervene in order to make the exchange rate revert to an assumed equilibrium -
‘mean’- level, which, nevertheless, may not equal the equilibrium level implied by the 
effects of market forces. Thus, we advocate that in order to detect any equilibrium 
relationship connecting prices and exchange rates, as formed by market forces alone, 
we should first identify and isolate effects exerted from intervention operations –
which are exogenous to the goods market arbitrage- on the short-run dynamics of the 
exchange rates.
5 This idea is in turn based on the well-known argument in the 
                                                           
5 This argument is in line with the suggestions of Brissimis et al. (2005).    8
empirical economics literature using cointegration techniques, which states that the 
explicit specification of the short-run dynamics is crucial for a successful estimation 
of the long-run relations of the variables of interest (see, inter alia, Juselius, 1995). 
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the 
specification of the theoretical arguments of the present study whereas section 3 
provides information on the exchange rate policies pursued in the economies under 
consideration. Section 4 presents the econometric methodology used. Section 5 
reports the empirical analysis and the obtained results. The final section summarises 
and concludes.  
 
2. The theoretical specification   
The point of the present work is that, by isolating the effects coming from 
intervention strategies on the exchange rate dynamics, which can also be considered 
as nominal shocks, we are then able to detect any equilibrium relationship connecting 
prices and exchange rates as formed by market forces alone. The standard error 
correction framework to test for any equilibrium relationship involving relative prices 
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where ζ1<0. s, p and p
* are the exchange rate, defined as units of domestic currency 
per unit of foreign currency, the domestic and foreign price level respectively, all 
expressed in logs, ∆ denotes the first difference operator and k denotes the number of 
lags involved in the estimation. (1) implies that a PPP relation of the form s = γ1 + γ2 
(p - p
*) is valid in the long run.
6 The first term on the right-hand side of (1) represents 
short-run deviations from PPP which are corrected through time at a speed given by ζ1 
and captures the influence of goods market arbitrage that tends to establish PPP in the 
long run. The short-run behaviour of the exchange rate is also allowed to be 
influenced by its own past values and current and past values of domestic and foreign 
inflation as indicated by the rest of the terms of the right hand side of (1).   
                                                           
6 For γ2 =1, strong PPP is implied, which assumes one-to-one long-run proportionality between 
exchange rates and relative prices; γ2 ≠ 1 implies weak PPP which allows long-run proportionality to 
differ from unity in order to account for information and transportation costs and measurement errors.   9
In the present work, we advocate instead the use of a framework which 
accounts for the effects of intervention – when they are significant – on the exchange 
rate dynamics, of the form: 
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where ζ2 < 0. l denotes the number of lags involved in the estimation and R is the (net) 
holdings of foreign assets by the central bank.
 The last term on the right hand side of 
(2) captures the effects of current and past intervention, as approximated by ∆R.
7 
Intervention can alter the market adjustment path towards PPP by exerting an impact 
on the exchange rate dynamics. More importantly, intervention can also affect the 
estimated equilibrium relationship, in the event that central banks target the exchange 




                                                           
7 Changes in reserves may not correspond perfectly to interventions for a number of reasons (see 
Neely, 2000); they may also be measured with error. Nevertheless, their use has been a common 
strategy in the early empirical works on intervention (see Taylor, 1982; Szakmary and Mathur, 1997). 
In the present work, given the scarcity of data on interventions in the six economies, we use this 
variable to proxy intervention.  
8 Brissimis et al. (2005) incorporate into the dynamics of a PPP-type exchange rate model the effects of 
intervention, approximated by ∆R, as following:  
∆st = λ(s – α –  (p - p
*)) t-1 + µ∆Rt ,   λ<0    (B1) 
 
In (B1), the first term on the right-hand side expresses the market adjustment path to the equilibrium 
PPP of the form s=α + (p - p
*), whereas the second term captures the effects of intervention. Brissimis 
et al. (2005) then assume that central banks determine intervention according to the policy rule:     
∆Rt = k1(st –  t s ) + k2∆st ,  k1, k2 < 0                                          (B2) 
with     t s = β0 + β1 (pt - p
*
t)                                                        (B3) 
The policy rule (B2) implies that intervention operations aim to reduce deviations of the exchange rate 
from a target rate() s  and at moderating exchange rate volatility. The target rate is set in terms of 
relative prices as shown in (B3) and need not be the PPP level; for example, for a country that uses its 
exchange rate as a disinflationary means, β1 < 1. Substituting (B2) and (B3) into (B1) yields: 
∆st = λ(st-1 – α  - pt-1 + p
*
t-1) + µk1(st – β0 – β1 (pt - p
*
t)) + µk2∆st                             (B4) 
which implies a static solution of the form:  
s=δ0 + δ1(p – p
*)             (B5) ,     with δ0 = (λα+µβ0)/(λ+µk1), δ1 = (λ+µk1β1)/(λ + µk1).        
Equation (B5) is not a long-run relationship since it incorporates short-run policy effects. As shown, δ1 
is a function of the policy rule parameter β1 and would take the value 1 only if β1 =  1 ,  i . e .  t h e  
authorities follow a PPP rule; in the general case (for β1 ≠ 1), long-run PPP would not be accepted, 
even though it holds (as implied by B1). Thus, testing for any long-run relationship between exchange 
rates and relative prices while omitting the short-run effects from intervention, would introduce 
estimation bias to the parameters of the equilibrium relationship.    10
3. Exchange rate policies in the selected economies 
  The economies under consideration are those of Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine and the analysis covers the period following their 
reforms to market economies at the beginning of the 1990s. The choice of the 
particular sample of countries is motivated by two reasons. First, we consider that 
intervention effects are likely to be important for the determination of the short-run 
dynamics of the six exchange rates for three reasons. (i) All six countries have 
adopted independently floating or managed floating exchange rate regimes in which 
the central banks have lots of discretion over intervention policies.
9 (ii) Despite the 
fact that the central banks of the countries issuing international reserve currencies 
rarely intervene anymore (with the exception of the Bank of Japan), those of the six 
countries intervened actively in the foreign exchange market during the period 
analysed (see Canales-Kriljenko et al., 2003). (iii) The central banks of the selected 
economies intervene in amounts that are significant relative to both market turnover 
and base money; moreover, a number of banking, monetary and foreign exchange 
regulations existing in these countries constrict the market’s size, thus making the 
central bank a more important player (see Canales-Kriljenko et al., 2003).
10 Second, 
no existing study using data from these six countries provides evidence for 
stationarity of the real exchange rates, or the validity of any PPP version in the long 
run.
11 
The monetary and exchange rate policies pursued in the six economies during 
the period examined share a number of common features. Transition started in 1992 in 
Russia and Ukraine and somewhat earlier in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. 
                                                           
9 For this reason, we do not include in the present sample the economies of Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, which pursued fixed pegs until 1996 and Hungary, which adopted a fixed peg until 1995 (see 
Hagen and Zhou, 2002). With a peg, intervention is obligatory (unless the peg is abandoned) rather 
than discretionary.  
10 Actually, similar experiences are observed in some other economies of the former Soviet Union, 
which have also adopted managed floating exchange rate regimes; nevertheless we analyse the 
experience of the six selected economies, as data for these six economies go back to the early 1990s. 
11 In particular: Thacker (1995) tests for stationarity of the real exchange rates of Poland and Hungary 
and rejects the hypothesis. Choudhry (1999) tests for cointegration between relative prices and nominal 
exchange rates of the currencies of Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovenia vis-a-vis the US$. He 
provides evidence of cointegration -but not of a PPP relationship- for Russia and Slovenia. Christev 
and Noorbakhsh (2000) test for PPP for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia applying cointegration techniques; they find evidence for cointegrating relationships but not 
for PPP. Sideris (2006) investigates the validity of PPP for a panel of seventeen CEEC economies 
(which comprises the six economies of the present analysis) vis-à-vis the US. He applies cointegration   11
The process of economic transition began with a liberalisation of the foreign exchange 
markets and the introduction of currency convertibility. These drastic steps resulted in 
initial deep undervaluations of the national currencies. At the same time, price 
liberalization was accompanied by very high inflation rates.  
  The countries adopted exchange rate regimes adequate for the specific 
conditions of each economy. All countries in the sample started with a conventional 
peg, but they moved to managed floating or intermediate regimes very soon.
12 
Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovenia abandoned their pegs in 1991; Russia and 
Ukraine in 1993. Slovenia adopted a managed float with no pre-announced path for 
the exchange rate for the whole post-1991 period. Romania adopted a managed float 
for the whole period, excluding the years 1992-1997, when it pursued an independent 
float. Bulgaria adopted a managed float from 1991 until 1997, when it moved back to 
a currency board agreement. Poland, Russia and Ukraine changed relatively often the 
regime they pursued; they adopted diverse intermediate and floating regimes in 
different sub-periods in the post-1991 period.
13  
  For most economies, price stability has been the core monetary policy target 
for most of the period and the authorities have pointed to the tight link between 
inflation and the exchange rate as a key reason why they preferred relatively stable 
exchange rates. Nevertheless, concern about the impact of an appreciation on 
economic performance played also a role on the conduct of exchange rate policies. 
This meant deciding whether any real currency appreciation was to be absorbed by 
allowing the currency to appreciate in nominal terms or allowing prices to rise. 
Priorities varied in different time periods, in the different countries. Thus, intervention 
strategies at times were conducted to accommodate for the inflation differential and 
maintain a stable real exchange rate, while at other times they let the real exchange 
rate appreciate. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and panel cointegration techniques and offers support for long-run equilibria, but not for any PPP 
relationship. 
12 Following Hagen and Zhou (2002), the exchange rate regimes can be classified to: (i) pegged 
regimes (dollar- and/or euro- izations, currency boards and conventional fixed pegs), (ii) floating 
regimes (managed floats with no preannounced path for the exchange rate and independent floats) and 
(iii) intermediate regimes (horizontal bands, crawling pegs and crawling bands).      
13 We report the official regimes adopted by the economies. Even though adjustment in the central 
parities and foreign exchange market interventions can produce differences between the official regime 
and the de facto regime (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), we consider that official regimes guide 
financial market expectations about exchange rate developments and affect international financial 
policy decisions.   12
  In the cases of Russia and Ukraine interest rate policies were not so important 
for the conduct of monetary policy and to smooth exchange rate volatility; thus the 
monetary and exchange rate policies were executed via foreign exchange market 
operations. In all countries, interventions were the main policy tool for the conduct of 
monetary policy for long periods and the authorities turned out to intervene often in 
the markets. In certain periods the monthly volatility of reserves exceeded that of 
nominal exchange rates (e.g. Poland for the period 1999-2002) being more than twice 
that of the exchange rate in  Russia and Ukraine for the period 1999-2002 (see Keller 
and Richardson, 2003).  
  
 4. Methodological issues 
To test for cointegration between exchange rates and domestic and foreign prices, the 
Johansen (1995) technique is applied. Let xt be the 3×1 vector of the endogenous 
variables, such that:  xt’ = (st, pt, pt*). Then a vector autoregressive representation 
(VAR) of xt can be re-parameterised in the vector error correction (VECM) form:    
t t t i t
m
i t D x x x ν ψ
ι
+ + Π + ∆ Π = ∆ − −
= ∑ 1
1
                                              (3) 
where  νt  ∼ΙΝ(0,Σ) and Dt contains a set of conditioning variables (e.g. constant, 
seasonal dummies, specific regime shift dummies). Π is the matrix of the long-run 
responses and in the event that there exist r cointegrating relationships, it can be 
expressed as the product of two matrices α and β' (Π= α β'), where β contains the r 
cointegrating vectors and α is the loadings matrix. Johansen provides the test statistics 
to define r and to test for linear restrictions on the parameters of either α or β'. In the 
present case and in the event that there is evidence of one cointegrating vector in the 
VAR: (i) The linear restriction β= (1, -β1, β1) implies the symmetry hypothesis H1 and 
provides evidence for the validity of weak PPP, or in other words that the real 
exchange rate follows a pattern based on market fundamentals. (ii) The restriction β= 
(1, -1, 1) implies the proportionality hypothesis H2 and provides evidence for the 
validity of strong PPP or stationarity of the real exchange rate.  
In a second step, the significance of policy effects is examined by including in 
the system the intervention variable ∆R, introduced with an adequate number of lags.   13
In the event that policy effects turn out to be significant, the Johansen analysis is 
performed in a VECM of the form: 
t i t
n
i t t i t
m
i t R D x x x ν µ ψ
ι ι








                            (4) 
where m and n denote the number of lags involved in the estimation. The inclusion of 
∆R changes the estimated coefficients of equation (3) which are denoted by a tilde. 
Following our theoretical assumptions, when policy effects are taken into account we 
would expect the values of the elements of the matrices α and β to vary and the test 
results related with the specification of the cointegrating vectors to change.
14  
An additional implicit assumption in (4), which also has to be tested, is that 
∆R is weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters of the long-run (cointegrating) 
relationship. Intuitively, weak exogeneity for ∆R with respect to the cointegrating 
parameters means that ∆R does not affect prices and exchange rates in the long run, 
so it should not be included in the cointegrating relationship; this implies that the 
long-run relationship is formed by the interaction of market forces alone.
15 Assuming 
weak exogeneity for ∆R, we are allowed to estimate a conditional system of the form 
of (4).
16 Based on the findings of Johansen (1992), maximum likelihood cointegration 
analysis in a conditional model provides an identical estimator to that based on a full 
system, if the conditioning variables (in the present case, ∆Rt) are weakly exogenous 





                                                           
14 Note that in the event that there is evidence for a cointegrating relationship of the PPP form s - γ1 - γ2 
(p - p
*), the error correction model for the exchange rate, derived from the VECM as defined in (4) 
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µ θ θ θ γ γ θ   
where θ<0. 
15 This does not mean necessarily that changes in reserves do not respond to changes in exchange rates 
or to deviations of the nominal exchange rate from a certain target level, in the short run. 
16 Estimation of the full system would imply ∆R to be included in the vector xt’ and cointegration 
analysis to be performed for a 4×1 vector of the form x1t’ = (st, pt, pt*, ∆Rt).     14
5. The empirical evidence 
5.1. The data set 
Quarterly seasonally unadjusted observations for the exchange rates of the 
domestic currencies of the six economies against the US$ are used. Examination of 
the behaviour of the real exchange rates against the US$ is based on the argument that 
the US$ functioned as a benchmark currency in these countries, during the period 
analyzed. The internal foreign exchange markets were mostly dollar denominated; at 
the same time, funds for economic reconstruction were provided by US sponsored 
institutions. Consumer price indices are used as the price measure for all economies, 
given that they are broadly similar as far as coverage is concerned. All series are 
obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics electronic database. Analysis 
covers the period 1990-2005; however, samples vary across countries. The start date 
for the analysis of each country depends on the period when the reforms started and 
the availability of the data. Estimation periods are reduced so as to accommodate the 
lag structure of the estimated models.  
5.2. Cointegration analysis without intervention effects 
In a first step, we estimate six three-dimensional VAR systems of the form of 
(3) using multivariate least squares. Four lagged levels for xt, chosen after performing a 
number of tests, seasonal dummies and an unconstrained constant are included in all 
systems. Five out of the six VARs necessitated the inclusion of impulse dummies to 
account for specific structural breaks observed in the sample period. Impulse dummies 
D98.3, D98.4 and D99.1, which take the value one in 1998:3, 1998:4 and 1999:1 
respectively, account for the effects of the Russian crisis. D04.2 accounts for the sharp 
increase in US prices caused by the rise in crude oil prices and petroleum–based energy 
costs in the second quarter of 2004 (associated with the effects of major hurricanes on 
oil producing areas of the US). In the Bulgarian system, D96.3, D96.4 and D97.1 
account for the effects of the economic and financial crisis occurred in 1996 and early 
1997 in the Bulgarian economy, which was characterized by hyperinflation and a 
severe depreciation of the lev vis-à-vis the US dollar. In the Romanian system, D97.1 
accounts for the 1997 stabilization program - perceived as a shock therapy program, 
which also included full liberalization of prices - launched in January 1997 by the 
newly elected government in Romania. The reported dummies turned out significant in   15
the respective systems, whereas their absence would mean non-normal residuals. The 
statistical properties of the residuals of the equations of the six systems are reported in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. The diagnostics do not indicate any serious misspecification 
and thus we can go on with the cointegration analysis.  
The results of the cointegration analysis are reported in Table 1. The second 
column of Table 1 reports the estimation sample period, whereas the third column 
names the dummies used. The outcomes of the maximum eigenvalue and trace 
statistics are reported in columns 4 – 9. Computed trace statistics indicate that the null 
hypothesis of non cointegration is rejected at the conventional 5% level of significance 
for all countries. According to the maximum eigenvalue test outcomes, non-
cointegration is rejected at the 5% significance level for all economies except Romania, 
for which rejection occurs at 10%. We thus proceed assuming that there exists one 
cointegrating vector for all six systems. We then test for the validity of the theoretical 
restrictions. The results are summarized in Table 2. According to the test statistics the 
hypothesis of stationarity of the real exchange rate is rejected at the 5% significance 
level in all countries in the sample. Weak PPP is rejected in all but the Romanian 
system. The US-Romanian weak PPP relationship takes the form: s – 0.859 (p-p*). 
5.3. The significance of the intervention effects 
 The second step in the empirical analysis is the evaluation of the importance of 
the intervention effects on the short-run behavior of the exchange rates. To this end, we 
include into the systems current and lagged values of ∆R. Four lagged levels for xt,   a 
constant, seasonal dummies and event specific dummies – the same as before – are 
included in the systems. We initially included four lags for ∆R but then kept those 
which were significant. As expected, current and lagged values of ∆R turn out to be 
significant in the equations modelling the behaviour of the exchange rates and not in 
the equations modelling domestic and foreign prices. The results are reported in Table 
3. The second column reports the values of ∆R that are used in the six VARs. The third 
column reports the respective χ
2-statistics for the joint hypothesis that the reported 
values of ∆R are not included in the equations modelling the behaviour of the exchange 
rates. The hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level, for all but the Bulgarian 
system, for which rejection occurs at 6.5%. We can thus state that the effects of ∆R 
turn out to be significant for the short-run behaviour of the exchange rates in all   16
economies, finding which is consistent with the general consensus of the literature on 
intervention.  
5.4. Cointegration analysis with intervention effects 
The inclusion of policy effects does not alter the stochastic properties of the 
VAR systems as indicated by the results of the diagnostic tests, which are reported in 
Table A2 in the Appendix. The findings of the Johansen technique for the six systems 
are presented in Table 4. As indicated by the results, the hypothesis that the 
cointegration rank is zero is rejected at the 5% significance level by both likelihood 
ratio tests, for all systems. We can thus assume one cointegrating vector for all six 
cases.  
Table 5 presents the outcomes of the test statistics for the theoretical 
hypotheses concerning the specification of the cointegrating vectors. Columns 3 and 4 
report the outcomes for the hypotheses of symmetry and proportionality, respectively. 
Column 2 reports the values obtained for the magnitude of β1. According to the test 
outcomes, now that policy effects are taken into account, weak PPP is accepted for all 
six systems. All estimated β1s – excluding that for the Romanian system – take values 
of high magnitude; they range from 1.96 in the case of Bulgaria to 2.66 in the case of 
Slovenia. The high magnitudes of the β1s indicate that, in equilibrium, exchange rates 
had to adjust significantly in order to accommodate the high rises in domestic prices 
with respect to the foreign prices. This finding can be attributed to the fast 
productivity growth observed in the CEEC economies during the examined period. 
Differential productivity and growth rates resulted in stable real appreciations of the 
CPI-based exchange rates for the five transition economies (see Coricelli and Jazbec, 
2001, for similar arguments). The outcomes imply the presence of strong Balassa-
Samuelson effects which have operated for long periods of time.
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It is only the estimated β1 coefficient in the Romanian relationship which takes 
a value very close to unity (0.95). In fact, strong PPP is rejected in all but the 
Romanian system. The rejection of strong PPP in the five countries can also be 
                                                           
17 The Balassa-Samuelson effect can be described briefly as follows: Suppose that the law of one price 
(LOOP) holds among traded goods. In the fast-growing economy, productivity growth, which is 
concentrated in the traded goods sector, will lead to wage rises without price rises. This rise in wages in 
the traded sector will lead to wage rises in the non-traded goods sector unjustified by productivity 
developments, and an overall rise in the CPI. Since LOOP holds in the traded goods sector and the 
nominal rate has remained constant, the real exchange rate appears appreciated.     17
attributed to Balassa-Samuelson effects. For the Romanian system, inclusion of 
intervention effects, leads us to accept stationarity for the real exchange rate. This 
implies that the central bank has been successful in the anti-inflationary policies they 
pursued in the Romanian economy.  
5.5. Weak exogeneity of ∆R with respect to the parameters of the long-run 
relationships 
The question of whether ∆R is weakly exogenous with respect to the estimated 
parameters of the long-run relations of the six VARs also needs to be assessed. The 
weak exogeneity test is essentially a test for the significance of the cointegrating 
vector when used as an error correction term in a single equation, modelling the 
behaviour of ∆R. The t-statistics for the error correction terms in the respective 
equations modelling ∆R of the six economies are reported in Table 6. They all reject 
statistical significance at the conventional 5% level. Thus, ∆R turns out to be weakly 
exogenous for the cointegrating parameters of all six systems. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In the present paper we examine the effects of official intervention on: (i) the 
short-run dynamics of the nominal exchange rates and (ii) the estimated long-run 
behaviour of the real exchange rates (more precisely, the long-run behaviour of 
nominal exchange rates in relation to the behaviour of relative prices). Our main 
argument is that, by identifying and “isolating” the effects coming from intervention 
operations on the short-run exchange rate dynamics (which can also be considered as 
nominal shocks), we can then detect a long-run equilibrium relationship connecting 
domestic and foreign prices and exchange rates, as formed by market forces alone.   
The paper presents empirical findings for the validity of the above argument 
by drawing on the experience of six CEEC economies in transition. These economies 
seem ideal candidates to evaluate the above argument as they share a number of 
common features: they all adopted flexible or managed floating exchange rate 
regimes, whereas their monetary authorities intervened often in the foreign markets in 
order to smooth exchange rate volatility or to pursue various monetary targets.    18
The results confirm our theoretical postulate: Effects due to authorities’ 
interventions in the foreign market turn out to be significant for the dynamic 
behaviour of all nominal exchange rates under consideration. The results related to the 
behaviour of exchange rates and relative prices in equilibrium change dramatically 
once intervention effects are taken into account in the empirical modelling of the 
short-run dynamics and indicate that omission of intervention effects would lead to 
mistakenly rejecting a long-run exchange rate pattern based on PPP. In other words, 
allowing for intervention effects, we indicate that PPP has enough content about the 
behaviour of the real exchange rates in equilibrium. In addition, the estimated 
equilibrium relationships indicate that the nominal exchange rates moved toward their 
equilibrium values in a constant pattern, which nevertheless implied a constant 
appreciation of the real exchange rates. This finding indicates the presence of strong 
Balassa-Samuelson effects which have operated for long periods of time. 
Nevertheless, stationarity of the real exchange rates is not accepted in five out of the 
six economies, and this may also be due to productivity shocks and the impact that 
productivity has on the pricing of the traded and non-traded goods and services 
sectors.    19
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Table 1: Cointegration tests: VARs without intervention effects. 
Country Sample   
Period 
Dummies  Maximal Eigenvalue   Trace statistic  
  r = 0  r = 1  r =2  r = 0  r = 1  r =2 
Bulgaria  1993.1-2004.4 D96.3,    D96.4, 
D97.1,  D04.2 
58.91**  7.55 0.12 66.58**  7.66 0.12 
Poland  1990.2-2004.3  D99.1  67.16**  9.11 0.00 76.28**  9.11 0.00 
Romania  1991.4-2005.1  D97.1  17.41  14.0 0.23 31.65*  14.23  0.23 
Russia  1995.1-2004.1  D98.3,  D98.4  41.08*  6.02 1.91 49.02**  7.93 1.91 
Slovenia  1994.1-2005.1    26.06*  10.56 0.169 36.79**  10.73 0.169 
Ukraine   1994.1-2005.1 D98.4  80.69** 2.85  0.469  84.01** 3.32  0.469 
  Critical values 
at 95% level 
  21.0 14.1 3.8  29.7 15.4 3.8 
Note: * and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2: Restriction Testing: VARs without intervention effects  
Country  H1 (β1= - β2)  H2 (β1=-1, β2=1) 
  χ
2 (1)  χ
2 (2) 
Bulgaria  8.064 (0.004)**  51.601 (0.000)** 
Poland  9.597 (0.001)**  61.639 (0.000)** 
Romania  1.098 (0.294)  7.568 (0.022)* 
Russia  44.853 (0.000)**  56.48 (0.000)** 
Slovenia  3.934 (0.047)*  26.971 (0.000)** 
Ukraine   38.072 (0.000)**  105.6 (0.000)** 
Note: * and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. 
 
Table 3: Tests for the significance of the intervention effects  
Country  Included Lags of ∆Rt  χ
2 ( degrees of  freedom) 
Bulgaria  ∆Rt-2, ∆Rt-3, ∆Rt-4  χ
2 ( 3)= 7.24(0.064) 
Poland  ∆Rt, ∆Rt-1, ∆Rt-2, ∆Rt-3, ∆Rt-4  χ
2 ( 5)= 11.36(0.045)* 
Romania  ∆Rt-1, ∆Rt-2  χ
2 ( 2)= 6.603(0.036)* 
Russia  ∆Rt, ∆Rt-1, ∆Rt-2, ∆Rt-3  χ
2 ( 4)= 17.58(0.01)** 
Slovenia  ∆Rt-1, ∆Rt-2, ∆Rt-3  χ
2 ( 3)= 7.80(0.051) 
Ukraine   ∆Rt, ∆Rt-1, ∆Rt-2, ∆Rt-3, ∆Rt-4  χ
2 ( 5)= 17.18(0.004)** 
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Table 4: Tests for the cointegration rank. VARs with intervention effects. 
Country Sample   
Period 
Dummies  Maximal Eigenvalue   Trace statistic  
  r = 0  r = 1  r =2  r = 0  r = 1  r =2 
Bulgaria  1993.1-2004.4 D96.3,    D96.4, 
D97.1,  D04.2 
51.96** 10.20  2.21  35.57** 12.41  2.21 
Poland  1990.2-2004.3 D99.1  67.39** 13.81  0.21  81.41** 14.02  0.208 
Romania  1991.4-2005.1  D97.1  23.3* 16.6* 1.69  41.64**  18.34 1.69 
Russia  1995.1-2004.1 D98.3,  D98.4  53.34** 14.06  2.39  69.79** 16.45*  2.39 
Slovenia  1994.1-2005.1    25.94**  6.634 0.092 32.66*  6.726 0.092 
Ukraine   1994.1-2005.1  D98.4  82.27**  16.9* 2.615 115.6**  15.31 2.615 
  Critical values 
at 95% level    21.0 14.1 3.8  29.7 15.4 3.8 
Note: * and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. 
 
Table 5: Restriction Testing: VARs with intervention effects  
Country  Estimated β1 H 1 (β1= - β2)  H2 (β1=-1, β2=1) 
    χ
2 (1)  χ
2 (2) 
Bulgaria  -1.96  4.09 (0.044)  47.29 (0.000)** 
Poland  -2.49  3.608 (0.057)  8.11 (0.017)* 
Romania  -0.95  2.392 (0.121)  5.98 (0.501) 
Russia  -2.08  1.908 (0.167)  73.41 (0.000)** 
Slovenia  -2.66  3.698 (0.054)  30.95 (0.000)** 
Ukraine   -2.24  2.159 (0.141)  106.37 (0.000)** 
Note: * and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. 
 
Table 6: Tests for weak exogeneity of ∆Rt  
Country   t-statistics (p-value) 
Bulgaria 1.545  (0.130) 
Poland 0.642  (0.608) 
Romania 0.216  (0.830) 
Russia 1.250  (0.237) 
Slovenia 0.822  (0.421) 
Ukraine   1.656 (0.126) 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Diagnostics for the initial VAR systems 
  Bulgaria Poland  Romania 
Autocorrelation  AR 1-4 F(4, 24)   AR 1-4 F(4, 37)  AR 1-4 F(4, 33) 
s  1.161 [0.352]  0.936 [0.453]  5.115 [0.003] ** 
p  1.941 [0.136]  0.211 [0.930]  1.955 [0.124] 
p*  0.872 [0.494]  1.008 [0.415]  0.717 [0.585] 
Normality  χ
2 (2)  χ
2 (2)  χ
2 (2) 
s  9.235 [0.009] *  3.285 [0.193]  9.173 [0.011] * 
p  0.510 [0.774]  6.958 [0.030] *  2.053 [0.358] 
p*  1.743 [0.418]  2.760 [0.251]  1.083 [0.581] 
Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity 
ARCH 4 F( 4, 20)  ARCH 4 F( 4, 33)  ARCH 4 F( 4, 29) 
s  0.106 [0.979]  0.523 [0.719]  1.878 [0.141] 
p  0.641 [0.639]  0.619 [0.651]  0.449 [0.772] 
p*  0.621 [0.652]  1.136 [0.356]  0.686 [0.607] 
 
  Russia Slovenia  Ukraine 
Autocorrelation  AR 1-3 F(3, 16)   AR 1-4 F(4, 25)  AR 1-4 F(4, 24) 
s  0.852 [0.485]  0.945 [0.454]  2.342 [0.084] 
p  1.344 [0.295]  2.730 [0.052]  1.942 [0.136] 
p*  1.183 [0.347]  0.513 [0.726]  0.764 [0.559] 
Normality   χ
2 (2)  χ
2 (2)  χ
2 (2) 
s  5.231 [0.073]  1.214 [0.545]  0.320 [0.852] 
p  0.494 [0.780]  0.343 [0.842]  1.580 [0.454] 
p*  1.499 [0.472]  1.535 [0.464]  2.597 [0.273] 
Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity 
ARCH 3  F( 3, 13)  ARCH 4 F( 4, 21)  ARCH 4 F( 4, 20) 
s  0.121 [0.945]  0.097 [0.982]  0.188 [0.942] 
p  0.007 [0.999]  0.125 [0.972]  0.095 [0.983] 
p*  0.324 [0.807]  0.110 [0.978]  0.666 [0.623] 
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Table A2: Diagnostics for the VAR systems including intervention effects 
  Bulgaria Poland  Romania 
Autocorrelation  AR 1-4 F(4, 21)   AR 1-4 F(4, 32)  AR 1-4 F(4, 30) 
s  1.334 [0.290]  0.955 [0.445]  3.513 [0.018] * 
p  1.756 [0.176]  0.366 [0.831]  1.574 [0.207] 
p*  1.463 [0.249]  1.619 [0.194]  0.862 [0.498] 
Normality  χ
2 (2)  χ
2 (2)  χ
2 (2) 
s  7.264 [0.027] *  5.864 [0.053]  5.967 [0.051] 
p  0.955 [0.620]  3.595 [0.166]  1.825 [0.401]   
p*  0.806 [0.668]  2.392 [0.303]  2.928 [0.231] 
Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity 
ARCH 4 F( 4, 17)  ARCH 4 F( 4, 28)  ARCH 4 F( 4, 26) 
s  0.104 [0.980]  0.978 [0.435]  0.858 [0.502] 
p  0.515 [0.725]  0.365 [0.831]  0.484 [0.747]    
p*  0.442 [0.776]  1.702 [0.178]  0.482 [0.748] 
 
  Russia Slovenia  Ukraine 
Autocorrelation  AR 1-3 F(3, 16)   AR 1-4 F(4, 23)  AR 1-4 F(4, 30) 
s  1.460 [0.271]  1.630 [0.201]  2.134 [0.116] 
p  0.033 [0.992]  2.627 [0.061]  0.099 [0.982] 
p*  2.101 [0.150]  1.145 [0.361]  0.515 [0.725] 
Normality  χ
2 (2)  χ
2 (2)  χ
2 (2) 
s  6.400 [0.041] *  1.421 [0.491]  0.464 [0.793] 
p  1.511 [0.470]  0.487 [0.784]  0.856 [0.652] 
p*  0.034 [0.983]  0.664 [0.718]  1.795 [0.408] 
Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity 
ARCH 3 F( 3, 10)  ARCH 4 F( 4, 19)  ARCH 4 F( 4, 15) 
s  0.096 [0.961]  0.166 [0.953]  0.110 [0.977] 
p  0.478 [0.705]  0.178 [0.947]  0.256 [0.902] 
p*  0.257 [0.855]  0.731 [0.582]  0.332 [0.852] 
Note: * and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. 
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